Early in July 2024, the Chinese Coast Guard detained Taiwan’s fishing boat, accusing it of illegal fishing near China’s territorial waters. Inside the boat, three Indonesian migrant fishers were working as crew members of Taiwan’s fishing boat. The presence of Southeast Asian migrant fishers working in Taiwanese fishing boats is not an uncommon phenomenon. Migrant fishers from Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam have preoccupied the fishing industry in Taiwan. In a precarious working environment, these cheap labourers risk their lives every day, including the risk of being detained by the Chinese government due to increasing patrols and military exercises surrounding the Taiwan Strait.

In the last two years, the relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have been characterised by increasing tension. In response to several developments occurring in Taiwan—such as the mutual visits between Taiwan’s high-ranking officials and their friends in the US, as well as the result of Taiwan’s presidential election held early this year—the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China hereafter) has become more blatant in demonstrating its determination to ‘reunite’ the self-governing island with China.

Besides making many statements that firmly emphasise its stance regarding Taiwan, China has also flexed its military muscle in the strait and beyond. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has conducted several military drills in the last two years. China’s recent aggressive behaviour toward Taiwan has made the question of whether China aims to take over the island in the immediate future more relevant. However, such a question had already become popular amongst Chinese observers in 2020. Furthermore, as the escalation of the tension in the Taiwan Strait will arguably have detrimental impacts on the Southeast Asian region, including Indonesia, the question of what Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries should do in response to the increased tension occurring in the Taiwan Strait becomes pertinent to ask as well. This article aims to address this last question.

Among the countries in the region, Indonesia and the Philippines have shown interest in promoting the safety of their citizens working in Taiwan should the tensions lead to an armed conflict. In his keynote address at the 21^st Asia Security Summit, the Shangri-la Dialogue, Bong Bong Marcos mentioned the importance of maintaining cross-strait stability as one of Manila’s strategic interests due to geographic proximity and the presence of Filipinos in Taiwan.¹ In a similar vein, Judha Nugraha, the Director of Indonesian Citizens Protection Overseas at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), highlighted the necessity of evacuating Indonesian citizens from Taiwan,² mainly migrant workers.

Given the sheer size of Southeast Asian citizens in Taiwan, accounting for approximately 700,000 people, protection diplomacy has been the main priority for governments in the region. Efforts to establish contingency plans have been in place for discussions among foreign policymakers and analysts. Each government also ensures its representative offices in Taiwan will be ready to exercise their duty of care should the tensions increase. The Indonesian government, for instance, enhanced the role and function of the Indonesian Economic and Trade Office (IETO) by setting up the Indonesian Citizens Protection Overseas Division and sending diplomats specifically assigned to oversee protection diplomacy in Taiwan. Despite its essential role and imminent threat across the strait, the division still needs more human resources to carry out its tasks.

The impact that any escalation of the tension between the PRC and Taiwan may have on the Southeast Asian region has made it imperative for the Southeast Asian countries to make a prudent response to the situation. As revealed by a study conducted by the ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute in 2023, tension has become a source of concern for the elite groups in Southeast Asian countries. Though 33.5 per cent of Southeast Asian respondents to the survey said that they would choose neutrality if conflict broke out in the Strait, most of the respondents opined that their government should “oppose the use of force through diplomatic measures.”³

Countries in the region should also reiterate their commitment to oppose any use of force in solving cross-strait disputes. The statement made by ASEAN in 2022 was a necessary step to remind all parties to exercise restraint and hold dialogues in solving the conflict. Track two dialogues involving epistemic communities and governments in their private capacity should be pursued and organised by the ASEAN member countries. The current regional dialogues have mainly left behind Taiwan. It is pertinent for the region to also convene track two dialogues with their counterparts in Taiwan, thus promoting understanding and confidence-building measures between ASEAN and Taiwan. Further, Taiwan’s contingency should also be shored up by enhancing the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre), especially in dealing with external crises.

References

International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), “21st Asia Security Summit The Shangri-La Dialogue,” IISS, 31 May 2024, https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library—content–migration/files/shangri-la-dialogue/2024/transcripts/final/keynote-address/ferdinand-r-marcos-jr-president-philippines–as-delivered.pdf (Accessed on 14 August 2024)
Kris Mada, “Indonesia Siapkan Rencana Darurat Terkait Taiwan,” Kompas, 14 April 2023, https://www.kompas.id/baca/internasional/2023/04/14/indonesia-siapkan-rencana-darurat-terkait-taiwan (Accessed on 15 August 2024)
William Choong and Hoang Thi Ha, “Southeast Asians mull over a Taiwan conflict: Big concerns but limited choices,” Think China, 24 February 2023, https://www.thinkchina.sg/politics/southeast-asians-mull-over-taiwan-conflict-big-concerns-limited-choices (Accessed on 15 August 2024)

Johanes Herlijanto, Ph.D is lecturer at the Communication Department, Universitas Pelita Harapan, and the chairperson of Forum Sinologi Indonesia (FSI)

Ratih Kabinawa, Ph.D holds a doctoral degree in International Relations and Asian Studies, from the School of Social Sciences, the University of Western Australia, Perth. She is currently Visiting Research Fellow at the International Master’s Program in Asia Pacific Studies at the National Chengchi University in Taipei, Taiwan, and an adjunct research fellow at the University of Western Australia.